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BANKRUPTCY LAW—RETHINKING THE DISCHARGE
OF LATE-FILED TAXES IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Justin H. Dion, Esq.*& Barbara Curatolo**
“[N]othing can be said to be certain except death and taxes.”–
Benjamin Franklin1
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was enacted in
* Justin Dion is a Professor of Legal Skills and the Director of Bar Admissions at
Western New England University School of Law. He is responsible for designing,
administering, and overseeing the Law School’s bar examination preparation efforts and
activities, including teaching classes, counseling bar applicants, and working with students on
an individual and group basis. Professor Dion is a proud alumnus of Western New England
University School of Law, where he served as Volume 22 Editor-in-Chief of the Western New
England Law Review in 2000. He is a certified mediator and is admitted to practice before the
Massachusetts and Connecticut State and Federal Courts, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States. He has of counsel status at
Bacon Wilson, P.C., in Springfield, Massachusetts, as a general practitioner with a focus on
bankruptcy and insolvency. Professor Dion is an experienced educator, who before becoming
employed full time in this role, was a longstanding adjunct professor at Western New England
University School of Law in which he was voted Adjunct Professor of the Year for three
years. He was also a Professor and Department Chair for the Legal Studies, Forensic Studies,
and Criminal Justice Departments at Bay Path University in Longmeadow, Massachusetts; he
was voted to serve two terms as Chair of the Faculty Assembly while there. Professor Dion
received the 2009 Adams Pro Bono Publico Award from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court for his outstanding commitment to providing volunteer legal services for underserved
populations in Massachusetts and was the founder of the Bay Path University Pro Bono
Bankruptcy Clinic, for which he served as Director for eight years. He currently serves as a
Hearing Officer for the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and is a Member of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Bar Admissions Curriculum Committee. Professor
Dion was also the recipient of the 2017 Distinguished Law Review Alumnus Award and
would like to thank his wife and fellow Western New England Law Review Alumni, Attorney
Kathleen E. Dion (‘09), for her assistance, ideas, and unwavering support.
** Barbara “Barbie” Curatolo is a third-year law student at Western New England
University School of Law, where she is member of the Western New England Law Review and
co-president of Western New England University’s chapter of the National Lawyers Guild. In
addition, Barbara has been a teaching assistant for Business Organizations, Civil Procedure,
and Constitutional Law.
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 68, 69 (Albert Henry Smyth, ed., 1907). The full quote
states: “Our new Constitution is now established, and has an appearance that promises
permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be certain except death
and taxes.” Id.
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order to improve bankruptcy law. However, BAPCPA has made the
issue of whether late-filed taxes are dischargeable even murkier than
before the amendments. After BAPCPA, some courts continued to
analyze claims as they had before the amendment. Others used a
“one-day-late rule” that prevented late-filed taxes from being
dischargeable—even if the taxes were filed only one day late. This
Article suggests a different approach. It argues that the legislature
intended tax debt associated with late-filed income tax returns be
dischargeable if the return is filed within two years of the due date.

INTRODUCTION
As a product of legislative statutes, bankruptcy rides the will of the
political landscape. Thus, the legislature decides how the economy,
personal freedom to discharge debt, creditor fairness, and tax liability
intersect. These decisions comprise the bankruptcy rights we have and
our ability to discharge debts in order to get a fresh start.
One issue the legislature has addressed is the dischargeability of
income taxes. Unfortunately, the language used to describe income tax
dischargeability has created confusion among practitioners and courts, as
current decisions seem to contradict the spirit, intent, and language of the
Bankruptcy Code. This Article argues that the legislature intended tax
debt associated with late-filed income tax returns be dischargeable if the
return is filed within two years of the due date, regardless of actions
taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
I.

PURPOSE OF BANKRUPTCY

The Bankruptcy Code was intended to give good, honest debtors a
fresh financial start.2 This concept recognizes two important factors: (1)

2. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as
being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at
the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.
Id. (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915)).
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that debt default is not malicious and typically occurs without the fault of
the debtor—often in conjunction with unanticipated medical issues,
unemployment, and divorce;3 and (2) having a large population of
debtors saddled with overwhelming non-dischargeable debt not only
financially paralyzes them, but ultimately harms the national economy
by disallowing these individuals the ability to again contribute to the
economy as responsible consumers.4
Harassment and debt collection tactics further propel the debtor into
poverty, psychological despair, and even homelessness.5 In turn, this
puts an additional burden on taxpayers who become forced to support
the debtor. Specifically, once a debtor begins missing debt payments,
and debt amounts increase due to default interest rates, late fees, and
penalties, default becomes increasingly difficult to cure. Ironically,
creditors make it harder for the debtor to find a way to cure arrears
because their collection tactics make it much more difficult for the
debtor to remain employed and earn income.6 Many states allow an
unsecured creditor to repossess a vehicle—thus frustrating the debtor’s
ability to get to and from their place of employment—while also
economically disincentivizing the debtor to work because their bank

3. Unanticipated medical bills, long term unemployment, and divorce are the three
primary factors that propel people into filing consumer bankruptcy. Mamie Marcus, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Bos., A Look at Household Bankruptcies, CMTYS & BANKING 15, 16–17
(Spring 2004),
https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/cb/PDF/Bankruptcies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HWB-FG4S]. A 2007 study found that sixty-nine percent of bankruptcies
were due to medical debt. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United
States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 744 (2009).
4. In addition to harassing phone calls and collection letters, debtors in arrears
eventually face being sued and, in most states, having wages garnished by up to twenty-five
percent. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2016) (limiting wage garnishment to twenty-five percent of
disposable earnings); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (2016) (allowing state laws prohibiting or
otherwise limiting wage garnishment to stand); Ashley L. Rodgers, Case Note, In Re Pruss:
Protecting Accounts Receivable from Garnishment, 54 ARK. L. REV. 435, 443–45 (2001)
(“[T]he wages of all laborers and mechanics . . . shall be exempt from seizure by
garnishment.”) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-208 (2017)).
5. See, e.g., Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits
Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/
article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/56PH-P3X2];
see also Aimee Constantineau, Fair for Whom? Why Debt-Collection Lawsuits in St. Louis
Violate the Procedural Due Process Rights of Low-Income Communities, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
479, 486–87 (2016) (“The combination of predatory debt collection, garnishment practices,
and an inability to repay debts has led to a cycle of poverty in Missouri that, for many, is
unending, unalterable, and unforgiving.”).
6. See ADP RESEARCH INST., GARNISHMENT: THE UNTOLD STORY 6 (2014),
http://www.adp.com/tools-and-resources/adp-research-institute/insights/~/media/RI/
pdf/Garnishment-whitepaper.ashx [https://perma.cc/3UEQ-K9R8].
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account and paycheck may be subject to a lien.7 Finally, many
employers check credit reports before hiring employees, thus making it
increasingly difficult for those with significant debt to find employment.8
II.

BANKRUPTCY CODE HISTORY

Ratification of the United States Constitution in 1789 gave Congress
the power to create “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”9
Although Congress’s first attempts to create uniform bankruptcy laws
failed to provide consistent debtor protection, the Bankruptcy
Amendatory Act of 193810 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197811
established the modern area of bankruptcy law. These acts created a
process for debtors to voluntarily file for bankruptcy to resolve
overwhelming debt.12 Specifically, section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code used to state: “[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of granting
the relief requested by the debtor.”13
Although this presumption created a fresh start that was utilized by
millions of Americans who were otherwise trapped and unable to pay
their debt, lending institutions were becoming increasingly concerned
about the growing numbers of bankruptcy filings that directly impacted
the lending institutions’ profitability.14 Accordingly, lending institutions

7. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1010.160 (1999) (“[T]he Secretary of State
established these procedures to be followed by a lienholder to allow the lienholder to obtain a
certificate of title for a repossessed vehicle for which the lienholder does not have an
assignment of title by the owner.”).
8. See Gary Rivlin, The Long Shadow of Bad Credit in a Job Search, N.Y. TIMES (May
11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/business/employers-pull-applicants-creditreports.html. A 2012 survey by the Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM)
found that forty-seven percent of employers run credit checks on job applicants. Id.;
Background Checking—The Use of Credit Background Checks in Hiring Decisions, SOC’Y
HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 19, 2012) https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-andforecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx [https://perma.cc/VB36FC8U].
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
10. See Bankruptcy Amendatory Act of 1938, ch. 567, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amended
1978). The Bankruptcy Amendatory Act of 1938 is also referred to as the “Chandler Act” in
honor of its legislative sponsor, the Honorable Walter Chandler, a Tennessee Congressman.
David S. Kennedy & Erno Lindner, The Bankruptcy Amendatory Act of 1938/the Legacy of
the Honorable Walter Chandler, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 769, 770, 776 (2011).
11. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(repealed).
12. See id. § 301.
13. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 12 n.59 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 99 n.59 (citation omitted).
14. The number of non-business consumer bankruptcy filings steadily increased up
through and including 2005. In 2005, a record number two million bankruptcies were filed.
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worked to change the perception of bankruptcy as a necessary financial
safety net used by good, honest people, to that of a legal loophole that
lets irresponsible and fraudulent people escape their legitimate debt
responsibilities.15 Ultimately, the lenders were able to use significant
resources to lobby Congress to draft legislation that would make filing
for bankruptcy a more difficult and complex process.16
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, entitled the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”),17 changed the aforementioned “presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor”18 to a presumption of abuse
that the debtor needed to overcome.19
BAPCPA was enacted “to improve bankruptcy law and practice by
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system
and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”20 The
reforms were meant to curb the increasing number of consumer
bankruptcy filings that were viewed as abusing the system.21 The steady
increase in consumer bankruptcy filings was a large motivating factor in
BAPCPA’s enactment—especially as it was perceived that the increased

See AM. BANKR. INST., ANNUAL BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS FILINGS BY YEAR (1980–
2016), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics [https://perma.cc/RG6T-JD3C].
15. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?,
75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 262 (2001).
16. “The credit card industry as a whole spent an estimated $100 million or more from
1995 to 2005 in lobbying to influence the bankruptcy reform.” Brendan A. Cappiello, The
Price of Inequality and the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
17 N.C. BANKING INST. 401, 432 (2013).
17. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2016)). The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act was passed by Congress on April
14, 2005, and signed into law by President George W. Bush on April 20, 2005 (to take effect
on October 17, 2005). Jordan M. Kirby, Unexpired Leases Under the New Bankruptcy Act: A
Win-Win for Landlords and Lenders?, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 379, 379 & n.2 (2006). The
law, among other things, created more obstacles and made it more cumbersome, difficult, and
expensive for individuals to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which liquidates debts, and instead
encouraged debtors to repay debts in a Chapter 13 reorganization bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
18. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 12 n.59.
19. Id. at 12–13.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 70.
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filings were having a negative effect on the nation’s economy. This
negative effect was viewed as being exacerbated by the prior law’s
failure to require debtors to repay their debts.22 Also, the prior version of
the bankruptcy system was seen to have “loopholes and incentives that
allow[ed] and—sometimes—even encourage[d] opportunistic personal
filings and abuse.”23 BAPCPA had the additional purpose of adding
consumer protection reforms, such as strengthening disclosure
requirements and heightening judicial oversight of the bankruptcy cases
for small businesses.24
Below is a discussion of BAPCPA’s impact in four primary areas.
A. Presumption of Debtor’s Abuse
Instead of assuming that someone filing bankruptcy is acting in
good faith when filing, the debtor now has the burden of proving good
faith. This good faith burden was objectively implemented by requiring
that Chapter 725 consumer debtors complete a “means test” to prove they
were not abusing the bankruptcy process by attempting to discharge
debts they otherwise could afford to repay in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.26
The test requires those with income above their state’s average, which is
adjusted for family size, to deduct presumed—not actual—monthly
expenses.27 If after deducting presumed expenses, the debtor has money
remaining28 (i.e., excess income), a presumption of abuse arises. Then
the debtor either (1) must convert their Chapter 7 case to one that
proceeds under Chapter 13, in which they propose a debt repayment

22. Id. at 5.
23. Id.
24. BAPCPA also labeled additional requirements for debtors to take financial
management courses and receive credit counseling as “consumer protection reforms.” Id. at
2–3.
25. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a liquidation bankruptcy, where assets are liquidated in
order to pay creditors, designed for low-income debtors. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84
(2016). On the other hand, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a reorganization bankruptcy where a
debtor repays the debt—or part of it—through a repayment plan. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§
1301–30 (2016).
26. For a more complete discussion of the functionality of the means test, see generally
Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just A Mean Test”: An Examination of
the Requirement That Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with Amended
Section 707(B), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413 (2008).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
28. A “presumption of abuse” will arise if: (1) the debtor has at least $182.50 in current
monthly income available after the allowed deductions (this equals $10,950 over five years)
regardless of the amount of debt, or (2) the debtor has at least $109.59 of such income ($6,575
over five years) and this sum would be enough to pay general unsecured creditors more than
twenty-five percent over five years. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2016).
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plan; or (2) the debtor’s Chapter 7 case is dismissed, and their debts are
not discharged.29
B. Extended Time Between Filings
An individual’s eligibility for discharge is an important change
brought about by BAPCPA. The time between a debtor’s eligibility to
receive a second Chapter 7 discharge was extended from six years to
eight years.30 “Under Chapter 13, prior to BAPCPA, debtors were
entitled to proceed to discharge regardless of whether they had received
discharge in a previous case. Under BAPCPA, however, individuals
generally are entitled to discharge their debts only if they did not receive
a discharge.”31
C. Required Credit Counseling and Debtor Education
Section 109(h) of BAPCPA requires that consumers complete a
credit counseling course from an approved third-party provider six
months before filing, to ensure better non-bankruptcy options are not
available.32 Additionally, before becoming eligible for a discharge, the
debtor must take a debtor education course to help the debtor understand
basic personal finance concepts that may prevent the need to file
bankruptcy again.33
D. Automatic Stay Limitation
Section 362(c)(3) provides that if the debtor files a Chapter 7, 11,34
or 13 case within one year after the dismissal of an earlier bankruptcy
case, the automatic stay in the new case terminates thirty days after the
filing.35 However, the debtor or some other party in interest may file a

29. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2016).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2016).
31. See Larry A. Pitman II & Jeffrey A. Deines, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform, 75 J. KAN. B. ASS’N. 20, 21 (2006).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2016).
33. Id.
34. A Chapter 11 Bankruptcy allows primarily corporate debtors to re-organize their
debts in an attempt to keep their businesses operational. The benefits of filing Chapter 11
include obtaining the benefits of the automatic stay to protect the debtor from actions by
lenders, including foreclosure. In addition, “[c]ompany executives are freed from pressure;
instead of spending much of their time holding off creditors and lenders, they can concentrate
on rehabilitating the company.” Lawrence R. Reich, Consider the Filing of a Chapter 11
Case, 33 WESTCHESTER B.J. 31, 33 (2006).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2016).
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motion and demonstrate that the present case was filed in good faith with
respect to the creditor, or creditors, being stayed.36
Overall, the impact of BAPCPA has been to generally make the
bankruptcy process less welcoming, more complex, more time
consuming, and more expensive.
Despite these consequences,
bankruptcy still exists to provide most honest debtors a fresh financial
start. The question then arises: how does bankruptcy deal with tax debt?
III.

BANKRUPTCY TREATMENT OF TAX DEBTS

Although the scope of bankruptcy discharge is broad and eliminates
the vast majority of debts owed by the filer, congressionally imposed
exceptions exist. Specifically, student loan debts, family support
obligations, and some tax obligations are the most prevalent nondischargeable debts.37
Generally speaking, the IRS levies graduated taxes on “taxable
income” that allows taxpayers to deduct certain exemptions from their
“gross income” (which in turn is broadly defined to include virtually all
accessions to wealth).38 Our tax system relies on accurate self-reporting,
with returns39 generally being due April 15th each year. A six-month
extension can be requested that permits the taxpayer additional time to
file the return; however, the extension does not extend the tax payment
deadline.40 Failure to file a timely tax return empowers the IRS to then
utilize various tools to assess and collect unfiled taxes.41
A. Pre-BAPCPA: Majority Position
Before BAPCPA, discharging taxes following a late-filed return was
fairly straightforward. Essentially, a tax was dischargeable if the tax
return was due more than three years ago and was filed more than two
years before the debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.42
36. Id.
37. See 11 U.S.C § 523 (2016); see also Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A
Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 513 (2000) (“Student loans were
thus categorized along with most tax debts, debts obtained by false pretenses or fraud, debts
for embezzlement, larceny, or similar legal impropriety, debts for child support or alimony,
debts for willful and malicious injury to another, and debts for criminal restitution.”).
38. See Treas. Reg § 1.61-1 (1960).
39. “[A] return of tax is a return (including an amended or adjusted return) filed by or
on behalf of a taxpayer reporting the liability of the taxpayer for tax under the Code, if the
type of return is identified in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.” Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(4) (2009).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4 (2008).
41. I.R.C. § 6020 (2016).
42. Contra 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2016).
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A complication arose if the IRS prepared a substitute tax return
before the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy relief. A substitute tax return is
a return prepared by the IRS on behalf of the taxpayer who has otherwise
failed to voluntarily file their tax returns on their own.43 Before the IRS
will prepare a substitute tax return,44 the taxpayer is sent a Notice of
Deficiency that notifies the taxpayer that they have ninety days to file a
late return or, alternatively, file a claim in Tax Court.45 If the taxpayer
fails to do either, the IRS will attempt to determine the taxpayer’s
income based on available information in their possession and file a
substitute return on the taxpayer’s behalf.46
In that narrow situation, a split arose among the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding tax dischargeability. The majority
approach is represented by In re Hindenlang,47 in which the IRS,
pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6020(b),48 prepared
43. See IRM 4.12.1.8.4 (Oct. 5, 2010).
When it has been determined that a taxpayer is liable for filing a return, and upon
due notice from the Service fails to do so, an SFR [Substitute for Return] will be
prepared by Examination.
Examination uses this procedure to establish an account and examine the records
of a taxpayer when the taxpayer refuses or is unable to file and information
received indicates that a return should be filed.
The examiner will follow the steps outlined IRM 4.12.1.5.2 IDRS Research, to
confirm no return has been filed.
An SFR, in and of itself, DOES NOT constitute a return under IRC 6020(b). For the
purpose of asserting the Failure to Pay Penalty, additional steps should be taken
before submitting the SFR package.
Id. (second emphasis added).
44. Substitute returns are discretionary. The IRS will not, and is not obligated to, file
substitute returns in all cases where the debtor fails to file a voluntary return. United States v.
Stafford, 983 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Filing Past Due Tax Returns, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/filing-past-due-tax-returns
[https://perma.cc/ET4K-JJRF] (“If you fail to file, we may file a substitute return for you.”)
(emphasis added).
45. Filing Past Due Tax Returns, supra note 44.
46. Treas. Reg. § 301.6020-1(b)(1) (2008).
[T]he Commissioner or other authorized Internal Revenue Officer or employee
shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he
can obtain through testimony or otherwise. The Commissioner or other authorized
Internal Revenue Officer or employee may make the return by gathering
information and making computations through electronic, automated or other
means to make a determination of the taxpayer’s tax liability.
Id.
47. United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir.
1999).
48. I.R.C. § 6020(b) (2016):
(1) Authority of Secretary to execute return.
If any person fails to make any return required by any internal revenue law or
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substitute returns and assessed taxes owed for the three years the debtor
had failed to file.49 The debtor later filed his tax returns for the missing
years, and three years later filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy seeking a
determination that the taxes were dischargeable.50 Although the
Bankruptcy Court found in favor of the debtor,51 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with the IRS. It found
that, although the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “return,”
“once a taxpayer has been assessed a deficiency, a Form 1040 submitted
by the taxpayer to the IRS no longer qualifies as a return” and would
thus be non-dischargeable.52 In doing so, the court adopted the Beard
test to determine what a “return” requires.53 Specifically, the court held
that four elements must be met: “(1) it must purport to be a return; (2) it
must be executed under the penalty of perjury; (3) it must contain
sufficient data to allow calculation of a tax; and (4) it must represent an
honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax
law.”54
Utilizing the Beard test, the court found no dispute that the first
three elements were met; however, the debtor’s significantly delayed
filing did not “represent an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the
requirements of the tax law,” and the burden to show otherwise was on

regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or
otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary shall make such return from
his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through
testimony or otherwise.
(2) Status of returns.
Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good
and sufficient for all legal purposes.
Id.
49. In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1031.
50. Id.
51. See generally In re Hindenlang, 214 B.R. 847 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997), rev’d, In re
Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029 (6th Cir. 1999).
52. In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1032.
53. Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777–79 (1984). This test was compiled by
the Tax Court by combining the principles from Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 304 (1940) and Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934). In re
Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033.
54. In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033 (quoting In re Hindenlang, 214 B.R. at 848).
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the debtor, not the IRS.55 As the court found that the debtor’s filing of a
1040 return after the IRS has prepared a substitute return had no legal
effect or impact on his tax obligation, the court concluded that the
debtor’s filing therefore did not qualify as a return under Beard, and
therefore was non-dischargeable.56 Other courts have followed this line
of reasoning to similarly determine that after the IRS prepares a
substitute return, the filing no longer qualifies as a return and the debt is
non-dischargeable.57
B. Pre-BAPCPA: Minority Position
A minority of courts have found differently when applying the
Beard test, such as the Eighth Circuit in In re Colsen.58 The Eighth
Circuit ultimately found that the fourth element of Beard, requiring the
debtor make an “honest and reasonable attempt,” or alternatively an
“honest and genuine effort,” was satisfied without needing to consider
the filer’s intent or timeliness of the returns, as those are not specific
elements of the test.59 In fact, the Eighth Circuit indicated that returns
filed after substitute returns still have value to the IRS, who often use
those returns to evaluate an offer to compromise.60 The court stated:
The government’s essential position is that because Mr. Colsen’s
1040 forms were filed after the IRS’s assessment, they do not evince
an honest, genuine attempt to satisfy the law and thus he has not
satisfied the requirement that returns be filed in order for tax liabilities
to be dischargeable. But we have no evidence to suggest that the
forms appeared obviously inaccurate or fabricated; indeed, Mr.
Colsen’s 1040 forms contained data that allowed the IRS to calculate
his tax obligation more accurately: The information contained in the
forms was honest and genuine enough to result in thousands of dollars
of abatements of tax and interest. . . .
The IRS apparently has found post-assessment returns useful, as
it has required taxpayers to file them before the agency would
consider proposed offers to compromise tax liabilities. Filing the
forms served an important purpose under the tax laws for Mr. Colsen.

55. Id. at 1034–35.
56. Id at 1034–35.
57. See, e.g., In re Justice, 817 F.3d 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2016). As will be later
discussed in Subpart V.C., this line of reasoning has continued in cases after BAPCPA’s
amendments.
58. Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2006).
59. Id. at 840.
60. Id. at 841.
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That the IRS did not also collect more tax as a result of Mr. Colsen’s
filings does not undermine their role in determining Mr. Colsen’s
ultimate liabilities. The theory of the case that the government
espouses holds only if we consider the accurate calculation of a
taxpayer’s obligations not to be a valid purpose that satisfies the tax
laws, which we decline to do. Our confidence in this result derives
strength from the principle that “exceptions from discharge are to be
strictly construed so as to give maximum effect to the policy of the
bankruptcy code to provide debtors with a ‘fresh start.’” 61

With this reasoning, the Eighth Circuit relied on the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code in order to favor the debtor, which the majority
position failed to do.62
C. BAPCPA’s Adjustment to 11 U.S.C. § 523
BAPCPA amended the language in 11 U.S.C. § 523 by adding what
is referred to as “the hanging paragraph,” which states:
For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return that
satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including
applicable filing requirements). Such term includes a return prepared
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or
similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a
return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, or a similar State or local law. 63

On its face, it would appear that the intent of this additional
language is to make clear that a taxpayer-filed tax return (or section
6020(a) return) is dischargeable, whereas a return prepared by the IRS
(or section 6020(b) return) is not.
The hanging paragraph was explained by the House Judiciary
Committee as being intended
to provide that a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, or similar State or local law, constitutes filing
a return (and the debt can be discharged) but that a return filed on
behalf of a taxpayer pursuant to section, 6020(b) of the Internal

61. Id. at 840–41 (quoting Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 484, 853 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
62. See supra Subpart III.A.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2016). “Because it is not a numbered paragraph, courts
routinely cite to it by using ‘§ 523(a)(*).’” Timothy M. Todd, Discharge of Late Tax Return
Debt in Bankruptcy: Fixing BAPCPA’s Draconian Hanging Paragraph, 24 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 433, 446 n.126 (2016).
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Revenue Code, or similar State or local law, does not constitute filing
a return (and the debt cannot be discharged).64

The intent of this addition was clearly to resolve a disagreement
among the lower courts regarding the treatment of IRS prepared tax
returns, with some courts holding them dischargeable and others holding
them non-dischargeable.65 Following this change, instead of limiting the
hanging paragraph to IRS-prepared returns, some of the courts that have
addressed the issue held the hanging paragraph adjustment reflected
Congress’s intent that all late-filed tax debt now be non-dischargeable.66
By way of example, the Tenth Circuit in In re Mallo determined that
late-filed tax returns filed after the IRS separately assessed the debtor’s
tax deficiencies was not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
because the returns failed to satisfy “the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law,” requirements that included filing deadlines.67
D. Distinction Between Federal Tax Obligations and State Tax
Obligations
All residents and citizens of the United States have the obligation to
pay federal income taxes.68 The IRS enforces federal tax laws and
collects the taxes for the federal government.69 State income taxes,
however, are separate—these are governed by each individual state
according to state law.70 Although bankruptcy is federal law, the
Bankruptcy Code often looks to state law to dictate many specific
relationships of the parties.
For example, in In re Fahey,71 the debtor filed seven years of his

64. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 103 (2005).
65. Compare In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341, 343 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that IRS
prepared tax returns did not qualify as returns and thus were not dischargeable), with In re
Ridgway, 322 B.R. 19, 37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (holding that Treasury Secretary’s
Substitute Returns qualify as returns for dischargeability purposes).
66. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
2015).
67. See Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313, 1325–27 (10th Cir. 2014).
68. State Income Tax vs. Federal Income Tax, U.S. TAX CTR., https://www.irs.com/
articles/state-income-tax-vs-federal-income-tax [https://perma.cc/VP6G-RCKC].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), Ch. 7 No. 10-21154-WCH, Ad.
No. 12-1204 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 11, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Perkins v. Mass. Dep’t of
Revenue, 507 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of
Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2015).
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Massachusetts state income tax returns late, making partial payments on
some years, and no payments on others.72 The debtor later filed Chapter
13 bankruptcy, and listed the tax debt owed at $105,555.66.73 After the
case was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the debtor received
his discharge, Massachusetts Department of Revenue (hereinafter
MDOR) issued a bill to the debtor and issued a Notice of Intent to
Suspend the Driver’s License.74 The debtor then moved to reopen his
case to determine tax debt dischargeability by way of filing an
adversarial proceeding against MDOR.75
After evaluating the respective positions of the parties, the court
held that because a late-filed Massachusetts tax return fails to satisfy the
deadline pursuant to state law76 it also fails to meet one of the
“applicable nonbankruptcy law” filing requirements.77
IV.

ONE-DAY-LATE RULE—LATE-FILED TAX RETURNS ARE NONDISCHARGEABLE

After BAPCPA, a few circuit courts have held that the new
language of applicable filing requirements in the hanging paragraph
includes the filing deadline. As a result, these courts have adopted a
one-day-late rule, where if a tax form was filed even one day late, that
the debt is non-dischargeable. The circuit courts that have adopted this
one-day-late-rule include the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. The cases
that have arisen in each circuit are discussed below.
A. First Circuit
When In re Fahey got to the First Circuit, the case involved four
debtors who did not file Massachusetts tax returns on time for multiple
years.78 While the debtors eventually filed the late returns, they did not
pay the taxes due, or the additional interest and late penalties. After at

72. In re Fahey, No. 10-21154-WCH, slip. op. at 1. Debtor filed late state tax returns
from 1997 through 2002, and 2004 through 2005. He made partial payments on his
outstanding 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 tax debt. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. According to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62(c) § 6(c), a Massachusetts Income Tax
Return requires that the return “be made on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month
following the close of the taxable year.” Id.
77. In re Fahey, No. 10-21154-WCH, slip op. at 5–6.
78. See generally Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2015).
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least two years had passed, the debtors each filed for bankruptcy.79
In assessing the dischargeability of these debts, the court
acknowledged that a straightforward reading of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) would classify the debt as dischargeable:
Looking solely at the foregoing language, and using a common notion
of what a “return” is, one could easily conclude that any return filed
after the due date but more than two years before a bankruptcy filing
would place the tax due under that return outside the section 523(a)(1)
exception, and thus within the broad category of dischargeable
debts.80

However, the court then looked at the definition of the term “return”
in the hanging paragraph and decided that timely filing is a “filing
requirement” under Massachusetts law.81 The court came to this
determination by use of the word “shall” in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62C,
§ 6(c) which states that returns
shall be made on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month
following the close of each taxable year. . . . This command that
returns “shall” be made by the due date certainly seems like a “filing
requirement.” . . . Accordingly, under this straightforward reading of
Massachusetts law, a return filed after the due date is a return not filed
as required, i.e., a return that does not satisfy “applicable filing
requirements.”82

This holding, although rooted in Massachusetts law, has been
interpreted in a manner that has been extended to other state law in the
circuit.83
B. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit reached the same one-day-late rule in In re
McCoy.84 In In re McCoy, the Fifth Circuit addressed the case of a
debtor who filed her Mississippi income tax returns for 1998 and 1999
late, and she filed for bankruptcy in 2007.85

79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 4–5 (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., Boudreau v. R.I. Div. of Taxation (In re Boudreau), 562 B.R. 853, 860–
61 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2017).
84. See generally McCoy v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n (In re McCoy), 666 F.3d 924
(5th Cir. 2012).
85. Id. at 925.
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In its assessment, the court looked at the BAPCPA amendments.
The debtor argued that the exceptions within section 523 were to be read
narrowly, and that reading the amendment in a manner that would
exclude returns filed after the deadline “render[ed] part of the statute
superfluous.” Therefore, the debtor advocated that the four-factor Beard
test should still be applied.86
The Fifth Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument by reading
BAPCPA’s amendment as “provid[ing] an unambiguous definition of
‘return,’” one that includes filing deadlines, and one that was intended to
replace the four-factor test.87 Furthermore, the court did not find the
language to be superfluous when read plainly as an “explanation of what
kinds of tax filings qualify as ‘returns’”—distinguishing § 6020(a)
returns from that of § 6020(b).88 This type of interpretation, the court
found, is consistent with the policies in place before BAPCPA.89
C. Tenth Circuit
In In re Mallo,90 the Tenth Circuit looked at the dischargeability of
returns filed after the IRS issued statutory notices of deficiencies. The
case arose when a married couple and another debtor—who made
substantially the same arguments in bankruptcy court—were given
different dischargeability results.91 When addressing the issue, the Tenth
Circuit interpreted the language of BAPCPA’s hanging paragraph as
including filing deadlines, thus excluding late-filed forms from
qualifying as returns.92 It explained that if this was not Congress’s
intent, then it should have used different language:
If the statutory mandate contained in the Tax Code that a return “shall
be filed on or before” a particular date is not an “applicable filing
requirement,” it is hard to imagine what would be. . . . If Congress
intended § 523 to define a return through application of the Beard test
or some other type of substantial compliance doctrine, rather than by a
taxpayer’s compliance with the applicable filing requirements
contained in the Tax Code, Congress could simply have defined a
return as one that “satisfies the requirements of applicable

86. Id. at 928–29.
87. Id. at 929.
88. Id. at 931.
89. Id. at 931–32.
90. See Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2014); see also supra
Subpart IV.C.
91. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1316–17.
92. Id. at 1327–28.
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nonbankruptcy law,” without qualifying the statement with the phrase
“including applicable filing requirements.” Alternatively, Congress
could have expressly stated a document is a return if it “satisfies the
requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable
substantive filing requirements)” or “(including applicable filing
requirements, except the date the filing is due).” But Congress did not
write the statute in any of these ways. It expressly incorporated
compliance with applicable filing requirements as part of the
definition of a return under the discharge provisions of § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code.93

Interestingly, the court concluded its analysis with an
acknowledgement that such an interpretation is in dissonance with the
purpose of bankruptcy and congressional intent:
[T]he plain and unambiguous language of § 523(a) excludes from the
definition of “return” all late-filed tax forms, except those prepared
with the assistance of the IRS under § 6020(a). And we are bound to
apply the statute according to its plain terms even if such an
interpretation seems contrary to the broader purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code or we are convinced that Congress intended a
different result.94

Thus, despite acknowledging that the interpretation would go
against the purpose of bankruptcy and congressional intent, the court
held that BAPCPA created the one-day-late rule and rendered late filings
non-dischargeable.95
V.

CONTINUATION OF THE BEARD TEST

Even though a few circuits have adopted the one-day-late rule after
BAPCPA, other circuit courts have refused and instead continue to use
the Beard test in order to analyze whether tax debt is dischargeable.96 In
doing so, the circuit split regarding the dischargeability of tax debts after
the IRS prepared a substitute return may continue even after the
BAPCPA amendments—especially as the Eighth Circuit has not yet
interpreted the BAPCPA amendments in regard to the dischargeability of
late-filed tax forms.97 If the Eighth Circuit decides in a similar manner
93. Id. at 1325.
94. Id. at 1327.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Giacchi v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (In re Giacchi), 856 F.3d 244, 247–49
(3d Cir. 2017).
97. Although the Eighth Circuit has looked at the BAPCPA amendments, and the
hanging paragraph, in other contexts. E.g., Capital One Auto Fin. v. Osborn, 515
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as the cases described below, continues the use of the Beard test, and
follows the precedent of In re Colsen,98 late forms filed after the IRS
prepared a substitute return would constitute a dischargeable return.99
The circuit courts—including the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—
that have decided to take the Beard test approach instead of the one-daylate rule following the BAPCPA amendments have continued the preBAPCPA majority position that after the IRS filed substitute returns,
late-filed tax forms are not returns.
A. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit took up the issue of the dischargeability of latefiled taxes and the BAPCPA amendments in In re Giacchi.100 This case
dealt with a debtor who did not file returns for 2000, 2001, and 2002
until after the IRS assessed tax liabilities for each of those years, and
filed for bankruptcy four years after the last filing.101
The court started its analysis by looking at the definition of “return”
that BAPCPA added to the Bankruptcy Code—specifically focusing on
the “applicable filing requirement” language. After noting that other
circuit courts have interpreted this language in a manner that would
prevent late-filed forms from being considered returns, the Third Circuit
decided not to weigh in on whether this interpretation was correct.102
The court avoided deciding that issue and continued to make use of the
Beard test in order to determine whether the debt was dischargeable:
Several of our sister circuits have interpreted “applicable filing
requirements” to include filing deadlines so that late-filed forms
cannot be “returns.” The government notes that this approach, called
the “one-day-late rule,” fails to harmonize provisions of § 523 that
contemplate some late-filed forms are “returns.” We need not reach
the question of whether the “one-day-late rule” is correct. Instead, we
join our sister circuits in applying Beard v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, which sets forth “the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law[,]” and we conclude that Giacchi’s tax debts are
non-dischargeable.103

Despite not subscribing to the one-day-late rule, the court’s use of

F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 2008).
98. See generally Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2006).
99. See supra Subpart III.B.
100. In re Giacchi, 856 F.3d at 246–47.
101. Id. at 246.
102. Id. at 247–48.
103. Id. at 247–48 (footnotes omitted).
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the Beard test still resulted in the court’s finding that late-filed forms
after the assessment did not qualify as returns. The court reasoned that
after the IRS’s assessment, the tax form failed to fulfill its purpose and
thus could not be in compliance with tax law.
Forms filed after their due dates and after an IRS assessment rarely, if
ever, qualify as an honest or reasonable attempt to satisfy the tax law.
This is because the purpose of a tax return is for the taxpayer to
provide information to the government regarding the amount of tax
due. If a taxpayer does not file a return, the IRS is required to
independently assess the taxpayer’s liability, as it did when Giacchi
failed to timely file his 2000, 2001, or 2002 tax returns. Once the IRS
assesses the taxpayer’s liability, a subsequent filing can no longer
serve the tax return’s purpose, and thus could not be an honest and
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax law. Here, there is no
dispute that Giacchi failed to file timely returns, and that, as a result
of Giacchi’s failure, the IRS had to estimate his taxes without his
assistance.104

In doing so, the court sided with the majority of courts before the
BAPCPA amendments that found that filings made after the IRS
prepared substitute returns are not dischargeable returns as exemplified
by In re Hindenlang.105
B. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit looked at the BAPCPA amendments in Smith v.
IRS, a case in which a debtor filed a tax return seven years late—three
years after a deficiency was assessed.106 Less than a year later, he
declared bankruptcy.107 Even though the Ninth Circuit had not
interpreted the new definition of “return” in BAPCPA, following the
decisions of other courts, the Ninth Circuit decided that the four-factor
Beard test, as applied in a pre-BAPCPA decision, In re Hatton,108 still

104. Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted).
105. See United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1032–33 (6th
Cir. 1999); see also supra Subpart IV.A.
106. Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), 828 F.3d 1094, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1066 (2017).
107. Id. at 1095–96.
108. See United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton), 220 F.3d 1057, 1060–61 (9th Cir.
2000). In re Hatton is a Ninth Circuit case that followed In re Hindenlang’s use of the Beard
test.
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applied.109 In doing so, the court decided that the fourth factor of the test
would not be satisfied when a filing was made late.110
[The debtor] argues that Hatton’s “honest and reasonable” inquiry
requires looking only at the face of the filing. . . . We disagree.
Hatton focused the “honest and reasonable” inquiry on the honesty
and reasonableness of the taxpayer’s conduct, not on any deficiency
in the documents’ form or content. . . . We hold that Hatton applies to
the bankruptcy code as amended, and that [the debtor]’s tax filing,
made seven years late and three years after the IRS assessed a
deficiency against him, was not an “honest and reasonable” attempt to
comply with the tax code.111

This holding, like in the Third Circuit,112 thus follows the preBAPCPA majority position, illustrated by In re Hindenlang,113 that
forms filed after the IRS prepares substitute returns are nondischargeable because they fail the Beard test.114
C. Eleventh Circuit
In the Eleventh Circuit’s In re Justice, the debtor filed returns after
the IRS issued deficiency notices.115 In determining whether or not the
filings qualify as returns, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the language in
the hanging paragraph and the interpretation of the three circuit courts
that have construed “applicable filing requirements” to include filing
deadlines.116 The Eleventh Circuit, however, neither accepted nor
rejected the “one-day-late rule” as even the use of the Beard test would
result in non-dischargeability.117
[W]e hold that, even under Justice’s preferred interpretation of
§ 523(*), his tax debts are non-dischargeable. We can assume
arguendo, although we expressly do not decide, that the one-day-late

109. In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1096.
110. Id. at 1096–97; see also In re Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061 (“[A] belated acceptance
of responsibility, however, does not constitute an honest and reasonable attempt to comply
with the requirements of the tax law.”).
111. In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097 (footnote omitted) (internal citation omitted).
112. See supra Subpart V.A.
113. See United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1032–33 (6th
Cir. 1999).
114. See supra Subpart III.A.
115. Justice v. United States (In re Justice), 817 F.3d 738, 740 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied 137 S. Ct. 1375 (2017).
116. Id. at 742–43.
117. Id. at 743–44.
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rule is incorrect. We can do this because, even under this assumption,
Justice’s tax debts are nevertheless non-dischargeable . . . .118

The Eleventh Circuit found that a debtor’s failure to file until after
the IRS contacts them “frustrates the requirements and objectives” of the
tax system and its purpose.119 “[The d]elinquency in filing, therefore, is
evidence that the taxpayer failed to make a reasonable effort to comply
with the law.”120 Because Justice filed late, the fourth factor of the
Beard test could not be met.121 In finding the debt non-dischargeable by
analyzing it under the Beard test first, the Eleventh Circuit avoided
interpreting the hanging paragraph, and joined the circuits discussed
above that continue to hold the pre-BAPCPA majority position.
D. Other Notable Cases
It is perhaps interesting to note the cases that have come out of the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Although these opinions, in their
majorities, have not offered much guidance on the interpretation of
BAPCPA’s hanging paragraph, they each have been cited by other cases
that look at this issue due to a unique use of the Beard test after the
enactment of BAPCPA and commentary made within a dissent.
1. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit’s In re Ciotti122 is unique as it concerned a
failure to report. The debtor filed returns, but later was issued a Letter of
Determination by the IRS that made adjustments to her returns,
increasing her income. The debtor failed to report the changes to the
Maryland tax authorities. The IRS, however, forwarded its findings and
the debtor’s returns were adjusted to $500,000 of due taxes, penalties,
and interest.123
The court had to determine whether the state form for reporting was
similar enough to a return to be treated as an “equivalent report or
notice.”124 To determine that the report was similar enough to a return,
the court applied the factors of the Beard test.125 As the Beard test was

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 743 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
See generally Maryland v. Ciotti (In re Ciotti), 638 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 280–81.
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not used to determine dischargeability of tax debt, other opinions have
cited In re Ciotti as distinguishable.126
In re Ciotti, while not providing a thorough analysis of the hanging
paragraph, notes the debtor-unfriendly BAPCPA changes in other
sections,127 which other courts have used as support for a debtorunfriendly interpretation of the hanging paragraph.128 The Fourth
Circuit, when looking at section 523(a)(1)(B) states:
It is apparent from the changes that Congress determined that the
same policy reasons that justify precluding the discharge of tax debt
when the debtor failed to file a return also justify precluding the
discharge of the tax debt when the debtor failed to file or give a
required report or notice corresponding to that debt. 129

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the failure to report, even if the
IRS gave the required information, was a breach of the “taxpayer’s
statutory obligation to report the information herself” and thus caused
the debt to be non-dischargeable.130
2. Seventh Circuit
Although the Seventh Circuit’s In re Payne decision did not involve
BAPCPA—since the debtor filed bankruptcy before the Act took
effect—Judge Easterbrook’s dissent mentioned BAPCPA and its effect:
“After the 2005 legislation, an untimely return can not lead to a
discharge—recall that the new language refers to ‘applicable
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).’”131 This
statement has been used to support the “one-day-late” rule in other
cases.132 The rest of the dissent, however, argues that a post-assessment
126. E.g., McCoy v. Miss. Tax Comm’n (In re McCoy), 666 F.3d 924, 930 (5th Cir.
2012).
Moreover, the issue in Ciotti—whether the attributes of a particular form make it
similar to a return—is different from the issue in the case before us—whether a
return that fails to comply with the applicable state filing requirements is a return.
Accordingly, Ciotti provides little guidance for the case at hand and does not
bolster McCoy’s argument.
Id.
127. See In re Ciotti, 638 F.3d at 279–80.
128. E.g., Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 10 n.11 (1st Cir.
2015).
129. In re Ciotti, 638 F.3d at 279–80.
130. Id. at 281.
131. Payne v. United States (In re Payne), 431 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 5 (“And at least one other circuit court
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return can be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the law under
the Beard test prior to the BAPCPA amendments.133 These arguments
have since appeared in numerous other cases that deal with that issue.134
VI.

RETHINKING THE DISCHARGEABILITY ISSUE

A. Ambiguous Text Should Be Read in Favor of the Debtor
“In view of the well-known purposes of the Bankruptcy Law
exceptions to the operation of a discharge thereunder should be confined
to those plainly expressed.”135 By its plain language, the hanging
paragraph was not intended to alter the landscape of tax dischargeability
by preventing all late-filed taxes from being discharged, but rather to
clarify dischargeability when the IRS prepares a substitute return. The
primary confusion stems from the hanging paragraph language that
defines a “return [as one] that satisfies the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).”136
Based on the emphasized language, and the courts’ varying
interpretations, the statute is ambiguous with two reasonably plausible
interpretations: (1) the language could simply mean that late-filed returns
that do not comply with substantive filing requirements are not
dischargeable; or (2) that in fact late-filed returns must meet substantive
and timing requirements.
In evaluating the ambiguity, it would appear that the context of the
surrounding statutory language clearly supports the first interpretation.
Specifically, reading the statute as a whole, in conjunction with the
reparative philosophy on which the Bankruptcy Code is based, the first
interpretation logically permits dischargeability. This interpretation
permits the debtor a fresh start as opposed to creating a new discharge
exception.
Reading the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 523 in a manner that
makes late-filed returns non-dischargeable ignores the surrounding
express language. Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 523 addresses the possibility

judge, in dictum, predicted such a result.”) (citing Payne v. United States (In re Payne), 431
F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
133. In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060–61 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
134. Compare Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir.
2006) (“[W]e find Judge Easterbrook’s arguments persuasive.”), with Mallo v. IRS (In re
Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. 2014) (disregarding Judge Easterbrook’s arguments as
not applicable after BAPCPA amendments).
135. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (emphasis added).
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of a late-filed return being dischargeable if it was filed at least two years
before the bankruptcy filing.137 Accordingly, if Congress already made
accommodations for the possibility of discharging late-filed returns, it
would not make sense to view the hanging paragraph through a
conservative, draconian lens that finds non-dischargeability. Thus, the
ambiguity should be resolved in a manner that still allows for the
possibility of late-filed returns.
B. Resolving the Ambiguity
There are two ways to resolve the ambiguity of the hanging
paragraph. The first involves statutory revision which will make the
language of 11 U.S.C. § 523 clearer. The second involves a compromise
by setting a time limit for when debt would be dischargeable.
1. Statutory Revision
The easiest and most obvious resolution, but possibly the most
difficult to implement, is amending the hanging paragraph to resolve the
ambiguity in favor of tax dischargeability. The hanging paragraph of 11
U.S.C. § 523 could be amended as follows:
For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return that
is filed by the debtor and otherwise satisfies the substantive
requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable
filing requirements). Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to
section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State
or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a final order
entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return
made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of

137. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(1)(A)–(C) (2016). Specifically, the statute exempts from
discharge debts:
(1) for a tax or a customs duty—
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of
this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if required—
(i) was not filed or given; or
(ii) was filed or given after the date on which such return, report, or notice was last
due, under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax.
Id.

2018]

DISCHARGE OF LATE-FILED TAXES IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

221

1986, or a similar State or local law. (emphasis added to proposed
additional text).

The proposed amendment attempts to clarify the intent that a
procedural flaw (i.e., a tax return not being filed on time) should not
prevent a filing that otherwise complies with tax filing requirements
from being deemed a return.
In contrast, congressional clarification could in fact confirm the
opposite position. Despite being contrary to the fresh start philosophy of
bankruptcy, Congress could confirm the intent of non-dischargeability
by revising the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 523 as follows:
For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return that
satisfies all the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law
(including applicable filing and time deadline requirements). Such
term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a
written stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a
nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant
to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar
State or local law.

Although contrary to the position of this Article, this revision would
make clear that Congress had intended to punish late tax filers and
exempt them from obtaining a fresh start. While this initially may seem
overly harsh, it could be argued that this policy is intended to incentivize
compliance with all tax filing requirements (including timeliness).
2. Another Option: A Tax Dischargeability Solution Based on
Compromise
Bankruptcy is a compromise. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code
strikes a balance between the rights of creditors who are entitled to
payment of their debts and the rights of debtors to have an opportunity to
start over and become financially productive citizens again. The law
pre-BAPCPA was generally understood to be a good example of this
balance. It gave the IRS at least three years to pursue and collect from a
debtor who owed taxes, while also recognizing that eventually tax
collection would be futile and the tax debt should be treated as other
unsecured debts and be subject to discharge.
With limited exceptions, federal and state tax filings are uniformly
due on April 15th.138 Courts have been concerned that the failure to file

138.

If April 15th falls on a weekend, or conflicts with a recognized holiday, the
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a tax return on time fails to deem the filed document a “return,” when it
would otherwise comply with applicable nonbankruptcy law. Under this
current interpretation, this implies that a tax filing filed—even one day
late—would not have been filed pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy
law (i.e., tax law), and would not be deemed a return and therefore
would be non-dischargeable.
Based on the compromising nature of bankruptcy law, this silly and
extreme result could not have been Congress’s intent when drafting the
hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 523. A better compromise may be
available that would take into account the needs of the taxpayer-debtors
and taxing authority creditors. This compromise would differ from the
current extreme position taken by some courts that tax debt associated
with late-filed returns is never dischargeable or a converse position that
tax debt associated with late-filed tax returns is always dischargeable.
Instead of operating within two extremes, a better policy would be to set
an extended time in which late-filed returns can be dischargeable,
coinciding with the six-year statute of limitations used to assess a tax
deficiency.139 Accordingly, if a taxpayer files a late return for a tax that
was due within the six years prior to filing (and otherwise meets the
other requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 523), the tax would be dischargeable.
From a policy perspective, this would balance the interests of the

date on which tax filings are due can be delayed.
When the last day prescribed under authority of the internal revenue laws for
performing any act falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the performance
of such act shall be considered timely if it is performed on the next succeeding day
which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. . . . [T]he term ‘legal holiday’
also means a Statewide legal holiday in the State where such office is located.
26 U.S.C. § 7503 (2016); Treas. Reg. § 301.7503-1 (1996). For example, in states such as
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, Patriot’s Day (or the alternate spelling,
Patriots’ Day), which commemorates the first battles of the Revolutionary War, sometimes
conflicts with the day on which tax filings are due, thus giving filers an additional day. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-29a(78) (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 4, § 1051 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ch. 6 § 12J (2017); WIS. STAT. § 118.02 (2018); see also Why the 2017 Tax Deadline Was
Moved
to
April
18,
FOX
BUS.
(Feb.
16,
2017),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/02/16/why-2017-tax-deadline-was-moved-to-april18.html [https://perma.cc/CR25-X4LV].
139. “The IRS normally must assess a tax deficiency within three years of the date a
tax return is filed. However, if a taxpayer omits a substantial amount of gross income from a
filed return, § 6501(e) extends the statute of limitations on assessment to six years.” Joan L.
Rood, Congress Expands the Six-Year Statute of Limitations on Assessment, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.bna.com/congress-expands-sixyear-n57982059483/#
[https://perma.cc/67PV-68QF]; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e) (2016).
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IRS and the debtor. The IRS would have ample time to assess and
pursue the taxpayer for all amounts owed, while also recognizing the
debtor’s need for a fresh start and the improbability of collecting on such
a stale tax debt. This compromise would work to ensure fairness on both
sides.
Again, this fix would require another amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code, however the effects would be beneficial for the debtor and the
IRS.
CONCLUSION
U.S. bankruptcy laws have consistently provided a safe haven to
millions of honest and hardworking debtors who have fallen on hard
times. In fact, the bankruptcy safety net has helped power our economy
as it both encourages consumer spending and entrepreneurship, while
also balancing fairness to creditors. This, in turn, allows debtors who
have fallen on hard times to shed paralyzing debt obligations in order to
once again become financially productive members of our society. As
such, it is contrary to the debtor rehabilitation philosophy of the
Bankruptcy Code that appellate courts have interpreted the hanging
paragraph tax language in such a harsh and restrictive manner.
Congress mandates that debtors be provided a “fresh start,” and
there is a presumption of debt dischargeability. Denying relief for latefiled tax returns is antithetical to this instruction since it leaves the debtor
paralyzed in a lifetime of financial constraint. Although the changes
promoted by BAPCPA modified certain debtor eligibility, when
considering the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, the hanging
paragraph language was clearly intended to apply only to substitute
returns, not to all late-filed returns. This overly broad interpretation is
contrary and harmful to the efforts of honest debtors seeking a fresh
financial start. Since the courts have failed to apply the language in a
correct and fair manner, Congressional action is necessary to most
effectively remedy the judicial misunderstanding.
Further, adjustments to the Bankruptcy Code should either clarify
Congress’s intent to create an extreme (either late-filed returns are never
dischargeable or are always dischargeable), or better yet, should impose
a new rule that permits dischargeability after six years of the due date as
a compromise that best works for all.
Although death and taxes will always be a certainty, congressional
clarification of the 11 U.S.C. § 523 hanging paragraph will at least let us
know if late-filed returns mean that we must in fact take our taxes to the
grave.

